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Plaintiffs/Appellants Robert D. Maack and Judith D. Maack (the 
"Maacks") submit the following Appellants1 Reply to Hoagland!s and 
Resource Designfs Brief: 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND RULE 
The only determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances or rules are Utah Code Anno. § 57-1-12 (1943), attached as 
Exhibit "A" and U.R.C.P. 56, attached as Exhibit "B." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment where the District Court 
determined that the builder of a new house containing numerous defects 
(which would cost well in excess of $100,000 to repair) was entitled to 
Summary Judgment as a matter of law despite those defects. 
The builder (Hoagland d/b/a Resource Design) built a home for the 
original owner (Jarvik) only partly in accordance with Jarvik?s plans; 
however, it was the builder who selected the materials and determined 
the specific methods of construction. 
Jarvik then sold the home to the Maacks, plaintiffs here. 
Approximately nine months later serious problems in the construction 
began to manifest themselves (i.e., stucco cracked and fell off, roofs 
and decks leaked excessive water, etc.) 
Originally the builder acknowledged responsibility to cure the 
defects. However, after working on the building for approximately one 
year (and beginning to appreciate the magnitude of the problems) the 
builder (Hoagland) refused to perform further work to cure the defects. 
The purchasers then brought suit against the builder under the 
following theories: 
1. Breach of Warranty: In the design, supervision and 
construction of the building, rendering it unfit for the purpose 
intended (i.e., repel the elements, habitation, etc.). 
2. Negligence: In the selection of materials and construction 
techniques utilized. 
3. Strict Liability: Defects in the building caused by faulty 
selection, application and installation of component parts of the 
structure (i.e., the stucco, membranes, deck and roofing materials and 
adhesives used in the construction of the walls, roofs and decks of the 
building, etc.). 
4. Declaratory Judgment: For the application of the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur. 
5. Negligent and/or Intentional Misrepresentation: In that the 
builder promised to cure the defects in the property at no cost to 
plaintiffs, he later refused to cure the defects and sought to recover 
$16,000+ for additional negligent and defective work. 
The District Court has ruled that "there exists no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact" in any of these causes of action and that the 
defendant (builder) is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Response 
1. Breach of Warranty Claim: There is no dispute of fact that 
the building is defective in many particulars and that the cost of 
2 
repair will exceed $100,000, The Court held as a matter of law that a 
subsequent purchaser could not recover from the builder for faulty 
construction absent "Privity of Contract". 
The Court held that unless the builder was a "builder/vendor" he 
had no liability to subsequent purchasers for "economic damages" caused 
by shoddy construction• 
The buyers respectfully contend that the builder/vendor defense 
extends only to defects in design and not defects resulting from 
improper manufacturing or construction techniques. 
In this case the Court ignored the distinction between "design" and 
"manufacturing" defects and improperly applied builder/vendor defense to 
both kinds of defects. 
Moreover, there is no case law in the State of Utah requiring 
"privity of contract for an owner to bring action against the builder 
for defective construction. The overwhelming weight of authority in the 
U.S. permits a subsequent purchaser who is damaged to sue a builder for 
breach of warranty. 
However, even if the Court were to determine privity of contract is 
necessary. In this case the warranty deed given by the seller (Jarvik) 
to the buyers (Maacks) conveyed all right title and interest in and to 
the subject property including Jarvikfs right to sue the builder for 
Breach of Warranty. 
2. Negligence: There is no dispute that the building is 
defective and that the plaintiffs have sustained significant economic 
damages; however, the District Court determined that a negligent 
building contractor is not liable to subsequent purchasers for "economic 
damages" to the building occasioned by the defects in the absence of 
privity. The Court held this despite the holding in W.R.H., Inc. v. 
3 
Economy Builders Supply, 633 P.2d 42 (Utah 1981) and Good v. 
Chrlstensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974). 
3. Strict Liability: There is no dispute that the building is 
substantially defective or that the plaintiffs have sustained 
significant economic damages; however, the District Court held that the 
doctrine of "Strict Liability" does not apply to a building contractor 
who selects and installs component parts into a structure. The Court 
held this despite the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Ernst W. Hahn, 
Inc. v. Armco Steel, 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979) and VI.R.H.. Inc. v. 
Economy Builders Supply, 633 P.2d 42 (Utah 1981). 
4. Declaratory Judgment on the Application of the Doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur: This claim merely sought a ruling by the Court that at 
trial the doctrine of res Ipsa loquitur should be applied to the builder 
since he had exclusive control over the structure at all relevant times 
and was in a better position to determine why the defects existed. The 
Court's granting of defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment mooted this 
issue. 
5. Negligent and/or Intentional Misrepresentation: The 
subsequent purchaser (Maacks) plead that the builder had injured and 
damaged them by his initial representation that he would accept 
responsibility to cure the defects at no cost to the owners. Then after 
a year of disruption, the defects were not cured and the builder sought 
$16,000+ under theories of implied contract and quantum meruit. The 
Court held that: 
2. Plaintiffs failed to establish any facts 
indicating that defendants made any material 
misrepresentations of fact or otherwise. 
Therefore, there is no basis for plaintiffs' 
negligent and/or intentional misrepresentation 
claim. 
4 
3. Plaintiffs failed to establish any facts 
indicating detrimental reliance by them upon 
alleged representations by defendants. Therefore, 
there is no basis for plaintiffs1 negligent and/or 
intentional misrepresentation claim. 
4. Because there is no basis for plaintiffs1 
intentional misrepresentation claim, there can be 
and is no basis for plaintiffs' punitive damage 
claim. 
5. Defendants have no duty to plaintiffs which 
could make them liable for loss of use and 
enjoyment or costs of repair or replacement of 
plaintiffs1 property. Therefore, there is not 
basis for plaintiffs' negligence and res ipsa 
loquitur claims. 
5.[sic] Plaintiffs1 failure to ask for a copy or 
written evidence of a "builder's warranty", their 
failure to condition their offer to purchase the 
Home on the existence of a "builder's warranty" or 
on the receipt of an acceptable inspection report 
especially in light of Robert Maack's professional 
training, clearly shows, and a reasonable jury 
could not find otherwise, that plaintiffs did not 
exercise ordinary, reasonable diligence. 
(Emphasis added.) It is respectfully submitted that the findings by the 
Court are "factual" findings not "legal" findings and that the Court has 
usurped the role of the jury on these issues. 
In short, the Court has ignored existing Utah case law and treated 




HOAGLAND AND RESOURCE MISSTATE THE NATURE OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW IN A DUPLICITOUS ARGUMENT THAT 
THE MAACK PRESENTED INSUFFICIENT FACTS IN THE 
RECORD TO THE TRIAL COURT. 
Hoagland and Resource Design cannot claim that there are 
insufficient facts in the record to support the Maacks' arguments 
against the dismissal of the Maacks' claim for relief based upon the 
implied warranty of habitability. Hoagland's and Resource Design's 
5 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs1 Second and Third Claim for Relief (R. 57-
59), in which the implied warranty of habitability was addressed, was a 
Motion pursuant to U.R.C.P. 12(b).1 
Hoagland and Resource Design, however, argue that they placed each 
and every element of the First Amended Complaint factually into dispute 
and demonstrated that there was no factual support for any element.2 
They would have this Court believe that their Motion for Summary 
Judgment presented to the District Court was based upon the fact that 
Hoagland's and Resource Design's workmanship was acceptable, as opposed 
to shoddy and negligent, and that there was no damage to the Maacks in 
the form of leaking roofs, decks, etc., and crumbling exterior stucco. 
A careful examination of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
1428-30) and Defendants1 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 1431-1512) both filed by Hoagland and Resource Design on 
March 25, 1992, dispels any such ill-conceived notion. The only thing 
Hoagland and Resource Design presented to the District Court in their 
Motion for Summary Judgment were the following issues, the first five of 
which were purely legal arguments and only the last of which was based 
upon the facts of the case: 
1. Economic losses cannot be recovered utilizing a tort-based 
claim and therefore the First Claim For Relief in plaintiffs1 
First Amended Complaint must be dismissed.3 
1
 Court Proceedings Transcript Volume I (the argument and 
the District Court's decision were based primarily upon legal 
arguments, with some minor undisputed facts being conceded during 
the argument). 
2
 Hoagland?s and Resource Design's Brief at 16-20. 
3
 R. 1435-1443. 
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2. The Second Claim For Relief in plaintiffs1 First Amended 
Complaint stating a "strict liability" claim "is deficient on 
its face."4 
3. The Third Claim For Relief seeking a declaratory judgment on 
the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in 
reality is not a claim for relief at all.5 
4. Plaintiffs' Fourth Claim for Relief fails to state of action 
for intentional or negligent misrepresentation.6 
5. Plaintiffs' punitive damage claim fails as a matter of law.7 
6. There is no factual or legal basis for any claim against Mr. 
Hoagland individually.8 
As can be seen from the preceding and a review of the Defendantsf 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the first five 
arguments presented are entirely legal arguments claiming that from a 
legal standpoint, regardless of the facts, recovery cannot not 
maintained on the claims presented in the First Amended Complaint. The 
only issue raised in HoaglandTs and Resource Design's Motion for Summary 
Judgment that was factually based was whether there was any evidence to 
support a conclusion that Hoagland was the contractor on the project. 
Substantial evidence was mustered to refute that proposition, including 
but not limited to the Standard Form Agreement Between Owner and 
Contractor, which specifically lists Hoagland as the contractor for the 
R. 1443. 
5
 R. 1446-47, 
6
 R. 1447-49. 
7
 R. 1449-51. 
8
 R. 1451-54, 
project,9 The remaining arguments are no different from the arguments 
presented in Hoaglandfs and Resource Design's initial U.R.C.P. 12(b) 
Motion obtaining the dismissal of the implied warranty of habitability 
claim. For example, Hoagland and Resource Design argued that in Utah a 
plaintiff, as a matter of law, cannot maintain a negligence claim for 
"economic damages." They conveniently, however, failed to cite to the 
District court the dispositive Utah case holding that economic damages 
are recoverable in Utah: W.R.H., Inc. v. Economy Builders Supply, 633 
P.2d 482 (Utah 1981).10 consequently, after discussing that particular 
issue from a legal standpoint for approximately eight pages in the 
defendants1 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
citing cases from Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, 
Washington, and case interpreting federal law, they failed to mention to 
the District Court a Utah Supreme Court case directly on point on this 
particular issue. 
Hoagland and Resource Design argue that Point I of the Brief of 
Appellant reads like an argument in opposition to a U.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
motion. Their Brief goes on to argue as follows: 
To establish a prima facie case of negligence the 
plaintiff must show: 
(1) a duty of reasonable care owed by the defendant to the 
plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty; (3) the causation, both 
actually and proximately, of injury; and (4) the suffering of 
damages by the plaintiff. 
Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985). 
While Resource Design's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the negligence claim was primarily based on the lack of the 
duty and breach of duty elements, Maacksf Brief completely 
fails to meet the burden of proof concerning the all essential 
elements of their negligence claim. It contains not a single 




citation to any evidence in the record which they claim 
supports their negligence claim. Maacksf Brief, pp. 5-8. 
Hoaglandfs and Resource Design's Brief at 19-20. 
The deception in this duplicitous argument, which grossly 
mischarachterizes the proceedings before the District Court, can easily 
be dispelled by reviewing what Hoagland's and Resource Design's counsel 
of record, Mr. Frankenburg, was saying to the District Court on exactly 
the same issue: 
Mr. Larsen: Basically, the other objection that we have is 
that all of the statements of fact that we had in our 
Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment 
are not included in the Rule 52 Statement, and they should be. 
Those are material facts. They should be taken virtually 
verbatim out of our memorandum. The 52 Statement, for 
example, does not include a statement that defective work 
existed in the house, defective work that Hoagland and 
Resource Design were responsible for. 
The Court: Response? 
Mr. Frankenburg: Obviously, whether there was defective work 
or not is an issue and was disputed throughout this case. The 
fact is that, as I have stated earlier, all that needs to be 
included in the Rule 52 Statement are those grounds, those 
undisputed facts and those grounds upon which the Court relied 
in granting summary judgment, not plaintiffs' argument. 
Mr. Heyrend: No, you Honor, I think that's clear. My view of 
the 52 findings is that that's what the Court found, 
undisputed, is the basis of the Court's ruling, and it should 
be included. If not, it should be amended as the motion's 
raised. I don't think there was an issue that work was not 
defective, however. I think both Mr. Jarvik --Dr. Jarvik and 
Hoagland conceded that, in effect, it was defective, but had 
grounds for not being responsible for that defective work. 
Mr. Larsen: That's basically the only way the court could 
rule. You would have to assume that the work was -- even if 
they said it wasn't, you would have to assume it was 
[defective] in the context of your ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
Mr. Frankenburg: I don't think it is really material, because 
our motion did not go to the issue you have whether there were 
defects or were not defects. Our motion was based upon those 
arguments that were set forth in our memoranda, and they did 
not go to the issue of defect of lack of defects. It has been 
9 
clear throughout this case we have denied the existence of any 
defects. 
Court Proceedings Transcript Volume IV at 149-51 (R. 2470-72) (emphasis 
added). Hoagland and Resource Design intentionally grossly 
mischarachterized the positions they embraced in the District Court. 
For the first time on appeal, Hoagland and Resource Design suggest 
that they placed into issue the totality of the case, requiring the 
Maacks to present evidence of Hoagland?s and Resource Design's shoddy 
and negligent construction practices and the damage that those practices 
caused. This simply was never an issue Hoagland or Resource Design 
raised before the District Court, and it is not something they can raise 
for the first time on appeal.11 
Only after the Maacks filed the Plaintiffs1 Memorandum in 
Opposition to Hoaglandfs and Resource Design's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 1970-89), in their Reply Memorandum of Defendant Resource 
Design and Timothy Hoagland in Support of Their Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 2059-72),12 did Hoagland and Resource Design for the very 
first time raise their claim that they owed no duty to the Maacks.13 
Raising an issue for the first time in a Reply Memorandum obviously is 
11
 E.g., Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah App. 
1989). 
12
 See Point I entitled Defendants Owe No Duty to Plaintiffs 
to Compensate Them for Alleged Defects in Plaintiffs' Home 
(R. 2060-65). 
13
 Hoagland and Resource Design also argue that their 
"Motion for Summary Judgment was primarily based upon duty and 
breach of duty elements . . . . " Hoagland's and Resource Design's 
Brief at 20. The "duty" issue, however, was something they raised 
for the very first time in the Reply Memorandum of Resource Design 
and Timothy Hoagland in Support of Their Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 2059-72). 
10 
improper. Ignoring that impropriety for a moment, however, it becomes 
abundantly clear that the only arguments on negligence and strict 
liability Hoagland and Resource Design presented to the District Court 
were solely legal arguments. Never, anywhere did they claim that there 
was some deficiency in the Maacks ability to prove the allegations of 
the First Amended Complaint or throw the underlying facts into dispute. 
HoaglandTs and Resource Design's argument that insufficient facts 
were mustered in opposition to their Motion for Summary Judgment also is 
dispelled by the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Hoagland and 
Resource Design argue that merely citing to a deposition transcript in 
support of a disputed or undisputed fact contained in the opposition to 
a motion for summary judgment is improper. Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration Rule 
4-501(2) reads as follows: 
Motions for summary judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points 
and authorities in support of a motion for summary 
judgment shall begin with a section that contains a 
concise statement of material facts as to which 
movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts 
shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and 
shall specifically refer to those portions of the 
record upon which the movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The 
points and authorities in opposition to a motion 
for summary judgment shall begin with a section 
that contains a concise statement of material facts 
as to which the party contends a genuine issue 
exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in 
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically 
refer to those portions of the record upon which 
the opposing party relies, and, if applicable shall 
state the numbered sentence or sentences of the 
movant's facts that are disputed. All material 
E.g., White v. Kent Medical Center, Inc., 61 Wash. App. 
163, 810 P. 2d 4, 8 (1991). The Maacks objected to Hoagland and 
Resource Design raising that issue for the very first time in their 
Reply Memorandum. Additional Authority and Objection to 
Defendants1 Raising Duty Issue (R. 2099-110). 
11 
facts set forth in the movantf s statement and 
properly supported by an accurate reference to the 
record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of 
summary judgment unless specifically controverted 
by the opposing party's statement. 
Obviously, the purpose of this rule is to avoid cluttering the Court's 
files with deposition transcripts. Not on a single occasion did 
Hoagland or Resource Design challenge the accuracy of any of the Maacks 
factual assertions or the support of any citation to a deposition 
transcript. Raising that type of argument for the first time on appeal 
is disingenuous.15 
Hoagland and Resource Design then go on to argue that the points 
made in the Argument section of the Brief of Appellant also are required 
to contain citations to the record. To the contrary, the only citations 
to the record that are necessary are citations in support of facts in 
the Statement of Facts section in an appellate brief. To suggest 
otherwise would require redundant, repetitious citations that would 
serve only to lengthen the briefs of the parties. 
POINT II. 
HOAGLAND AND RESOURCE DESIGN SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO 
THE SAME LIABILITY FOR THEIR NEGLIGENT ACTS AS ALL 
OTHER MEMBERS OF SOCIETY; THEY ARE NOT ENTITLED A 
SPECIAL EXEMPTION BECAUSE THEY ARE BUILDING 
CONTRACTORS. 
It is the basic policy of this and every other state that every 
person be responsible for the consequences of his negligent acts.16 
Hoagland and Resource Design are not entitled to a special exemption due 
to their status as building contractors. A number of courts have so 
15
 E.g., Marchant v. Park City, 111 P. 2d 677, 682 (Utah App. 
1989). 
16
 E.g., Cooper v. Bray, 148 Cal. Rptr. 148, 582 P.2d 604, 
612 (1978) (California Supreme Court In bank). 
12 
held. For example, in Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 
(Wyo. 1979), the Wyoming Supreme Court stated as follows: 
A builder of a home is also liable for damages 
which are foreseeable and which are caused by his 
negligence, to subsequent purchasers of such a home 
with whom he has no contractual relationship even 
though his work is accepted by the first owner 
before the damages becomes manifest. 
Id. at 736. Likewise, the Colorado Supreme Court en banc in 
Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983), reversed 
the law in Colorado since 1955, holding that the subsequent purchaser is 
entitled to maintain a negligence cause of action against the builder. 
Id. at 1045. A builder's liability, like everyone else's liability for 
their negligent conduct, should be limited by the concepts of 
foreseeability and the applicable statute of limitations or statute of 
repose. In this case, it was certainly foreseeable by Hoagland that 
Jarvik might do exactly as he did, have a job change requiring him to 
move out of state and sell the residence. It was foreseeable on 
Hoaglandfs part that his negligent construction practices resulting in 
serious defects in the home would cause damage to a subsequent 
purchaser. The District Court erred in concluding that as a matter of 
law the Maacks were not entitled to maintain the negligence cause of 
action on any set of facts. 
POINT III. 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SQUARELY HELD THAT ECONOMIC 
DAMAGES ARE RECOVERABLE UNDER A NEGLIGENCE THEORY. 
W.R.H., Inc. v. Economy Builders Supply, 633 P.2d 42 (Utah 1981), 
puts to rest the issue of whether economic damages can be recovered 
utilizing a tort-based theory. Hoagland and Resource Design make an 
effort to distinguish the W.R.H. case by suggesting that it is factually 
different from the instant case, claiming the W.R.fJ. involved an action 
13 
commenced by a purchaser of plywood against the retailer and 
manufacturer of the siding,17 While the Maacks purchased more than 
simply plywood, that type of factual distinction is vacuous at best. 
What Hoagland and Resource Design ignore is that the facts of the case 
are not controlling. W.R.H. stands for the broad principle that 
concepts of negligence are appropriate to protect a purchaser from 
economic loss. Further, there is nothing in the W.R.H. case that 
indicates a requirement of privity of contract in order to receive the 
benefits of being protected by the application of classic negligence 
concepts to protect a purchaser from economic losses. Privity would 
unduly restrict negligence concepts, would blur the distinction between 
the two, and is not a requirement under Utah Law.18 Further, as 
Hoagland and Resource Design are well aware, privity has been long 
abandoned as an element of tort-based causes of action. 
The W.R.H. case also recognized the case authority cited in 
Hoagland's and Resource Design's Brief and specifically rejects both 
that case authority and its reasoning. 
Contrary to Hoaglandfs and Resource Design's assertion, the quality 
of the work they were obligated to perform was not "defined and 
established by the construction contract with Jarvik."19 As matter of 
fact, Mr. Hoagland in his deposition took exactly the opposite position. 
He claimed that the contract was altered, allowing him to deviate from 
the application of synthetic stucco to exterior of the residence. If 
the Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor,20 which 
17
 Hoagland's and Resource Design's Brief at 28. 
18
 E.g., Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P. 2d 806, 808 
(Utah 1974). 
19
 Hoaglandfs and Resource Design's Brief at 29. 
20
 Attached as Exhibit F to the Brief of Appellants. 
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incorporates by reference the plans and specifications,21 controls, then 
Hoagland clearly breached the duty he owed to Jarvik and to subsequent 
purchasers by applying cement-based stucco rather than acrylic stucco to 
the exterior of the residence. 
Applying concepts of negligence limited by the doctrine of 
foreseeability, and having claims for relief based upon negligence 
further limited by the applicable statute of limitations and statute of 
repose do not, as Hoagland and Resource Design contend, create some 
nightmarish unlimited extension of liability for builders and 
contractors. It merely allows the second purchaser and first occupant 
of a home, such as the Maacks, to be protected to the same extent as 
anyone simply operating an automobile on the streets. To accept 
Hoaglandfs and Resource Design's argument would expose to economic chaos 
second buyers, who were the first occupants of a home and, therefore, 
the first individuals capable of detecting latent defects that only 
manifest themselves after an extended period of time. For no principled 
reason, it would insulate negligent contractors who engaged in shoddy 
building practices, including building practices in violation of the 
Uniform Building Code. It would encourage builders to convey property 
to buyers through a strawman so that there liability to the buyer was 
extinguished. Builders and contractors should be subject to the same 
tort law that governs everyone else's conduct. 
Attached in part as Exhibit G to the Brief of Appellants. 
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POINT IV. 
THE APPLICATION OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF 
HABITABILITY TO THE FIRST OCCUPANT OF A HOME IS 
NECESSARY TO PROTECT UTAH HOMEOWNERS FROM 
EXPENSIVE, SHODDY BUILDING PRACTICES. 
In their Brief, Resource Design and Hoagland argue that the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Wade v. Jobe, 818 P. 2d 1006 (Utah 1991), 
recognizing a cause of action for breach of an implied warranty of 
habitability in residential leases, should not be extended to the 
purchase of residential homes.22 Resource Design and Hoagland assert 
that tenants require more protection than home purchasers because they 
have an ongoing relationship with the landlord and are usually dependant 
on the landlord for repairs and maintenance. Additionally, Resource 
Design and Hoagland claim an implied warranty of habitability would pose 
"unlimited liability" to builders if home purchasers could enforce 
implied warranties. Resource Design's and Hoaglandfs arguments are 
simply a plea to the Court to perpetuate the rule of caveat emptor and 
insulate builders from liability for latent, serious defects in 
residential home construction. 
In JoJbe, the Court rejected a similar argument by residential 
landlords and adopted the common law implied warranty of habitability 
for residential leases. Id. at 1010. Although the relationship between 
landlord and tenant may differ from those between builder and purchaser, 
the policy interests articulated in Jobe are no different than the 
policy interests supporting adoption of the common law implied warranty 
of habitability in favor of purchasers of residential homes. 
Originally, the implied warranty of habitability in other states was 
adopted in the context of purchaser, not lessee. 
Resource Design's and Hoagland!s Brief at 38-40. 
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The purchase of a family home is perhaps the single most expensive 
investment made by family members. Although a renter can relocate if an 
apartment contains latent defects affecting its habitability, a home 
purchaser faces the possibility of financial ruination if the family 
home contains latent defects requiring major repairs. As in JoJbe, the 
ordinary purchaser of a residential home is dependant on the honesty and 
skill of the builder because the purchaser may lack the knowledge, 
capacity, or opportunity to ensure that the home being purchased is in 
a safe condition and free of latent defects. Id. at 1010. In essence, 
the implied warranty of habitability in residential homes serves to 
protect innocent purchasers and hold builders accountable for their 
work.23 This result is "[c]onsistent with prevailing trends in consumer 
law, products liability law, and the law of torts . . . ." Id. 
Resource Design and Hoagland baldly assert that even if the Court 
adopted the implied warranty of habitability in the sale of residential 
homes, the Maacks should be deprived of the warranty because they lack 
privity of contract with the builder.24 Although there are states that 
retain the antiquated concept of privity of contract in the context of 
the implied warranty of habitability, the majority view rejects a 
privity requirement and holds that subsequent purchasers are entitled to 
the protection of the implied warranty of habitability for a reasonable 
Although Defendants make much of the fact that the Maacks 
should have obtained a home inspection, their argument ignores the 
fact that the seller's agent represented that there was a "builders 
warranty." More importantly, this type of argument is merely an 
effort to maintain the rule of caveat emptor and shift 
responsibility for a builder's construction errors to the purchaser 
or the builder's real estate agents. In the last analysis, this 
type of argument is simply an effort to distract the Court from the 
issue of whether Utah should adopt the implied warranty of 
habitability in residential homes. 
24
 Resource Design's and Hoagland's Brief at 41. 
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length of time. E.g., Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 
(Wyo. 1979 ). 2 5 
Significantly, the Maacks were the first occupants of the home. 
Even assuming the Court was unwilling to extend the implied warranty of 
habitability to subsequent purchasers, the Maacks stand in the same 
position as Jarvik with respect to their ability to identify structural 
defects in the home. Even the minority jurisdictions rejecting the 
"subsequent purchaser" rule and extend the warranty to the first 
occupants of the home.26 Resource Design's and Hoaglandfs arguments 
lack merit and should be rejected. 
Resource Design and Hoagland also claim that adoption of the 
implied warranty of habitability will impose "unlimited liability" on 
builders for up to fifty years after construction of the home. This 
argument is absurd. Contrary to their hyperbole, the courts that have 
extended the warranty to subsequent purchasers have allowed protection 
for a "reasonable length of time." Moxley v. Laramie Builders, supra. 
It is clear that a reasonable length of time can be determined by the 
E.g., Keyes v. Guy Bailey Homes, Inc., 439 So.2d 670 
(Miss. 1983); Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 139 Ariz. 242, 
678 P. 2d 427 (1984); Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co. , Inc., 264 Ind. 227, 
342 N.E.2d 619 (1976); Redarowlcz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324 
(111. 1982); Hermes v. Stalano, 181 N.J. Super 424. 437 A.2d 925 
(1981); Gupta v. Rltter Homes, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1983). 
Blagg v. Fred Hunt Company, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 321 (Ark. 1981); 
Terllnde v. Neely, 271 S.E.2d 768 (S.C. 1980); Elden v. Simmons, 
631 P.2d 739 (Okl. 1981); Lempke v. Dagenals, 547 A.2d 298 (N.H. 
1988); Sewell v. Gregory, 371 S.E.2d 82 (W.Va. 1988) see Anno., 10 
A.L.R.4th 395 (1981). 
26
 E.g., Gay v. Cornwall, 6 Wash. App. 595, 494 P.2d 1371 
(1972); Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes Inc., 578 P.2d 637 (Colo. 
1978). 
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applicable statute of limitations or statute of repose. E.g., Woodward 
v. Churko Construction Co., Inc., 687 P.2d 1269 (Ariz. 1984).27 
Similarly, Resource Design and Hoagland assert that the Maacks 
should have obtained a home inspection which would have potentially 
revealed the latent defects at issue. This argument, however, is merely 
an effort to maintain the rule of caveat emptor and shift responsibility 
for major construction errors to the purchaser. 
Finally, defendants urge the Court to adopt a rule that denies home 
purchasers protection of the implied warranty of habitability unless (1) 
the builder-vendor is a commercial builder; and (2) the unit is built 
for sale rather than personal occupancy. As a threshold matter, this 
rule of law appears to be a creature unique to the law of Washington. 
Moreover, to the extent defendants suggest the home purchased by the 
Maacks was not "built for sale," their argument is misleading and wrong. 
This part of the rule refers to builders who occupy a home prior to 
sale, which is not a factor in this case.28 
27
 Although Defendants cited Woodward v. Churko Construction 
Co., Inc., supra, as direct authority for the proposition that the 
implied warranty of habitability does not extend to subsequent 
purchasers of residential homes, the Arizona Supreme Court, in 
Woodward, reaffirmed its decision in Richards v. Power Craft Homes, 
Inc., 139 Ariz. 242, 678 P.2d 427 (1984), holding that the implied 
warranty of workman-like performance and habitability "runs to 
subsequent purchasers of the residence." Woodward, 687 P. 2d at 
1271. 
28




LIMITATIONS ON A BUILDER'S "DUTY" AND "THE IMPLIED 
WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY" AS APPLIED TO SUBSEQUENT 
PURCHASERS SHOULD BE RATIONALLY LIMITED BASED UPON 
WHETHER THE BUILDER WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DESIGN 
OR CONSTRUCTION DEFECT, UTILIZING THE PRINCIPALS OF 
THE SO-CALLED "GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE." 
In addition to limiting a builder's liability based upon the 
applicable statute of limitations and statute of repose, it is 
reasonable to rationally limit the builder's liability utilizing the so-
called government contractor's defense. Basically, the government 
contractor's defense is that where a contractor builds a product in 
accordance with government specifications and something goes wrong with 
the product or it does not work, as long as the contractor complies with 
the specifications, he is not liable.29 
A. Is the Contractor Responsible for the Design? 
Obviously, certain home builders will build homes in accordance 
with the owner's specifications. If a builder complies with an owner's 
specifications and design, he should not be liable for any subsequent 
problems with the home, absent a defect in a construction method or 
material. If there is a defect in the construction technique or in the 
materials utilized by the contractor (assuming he selected the 
materials), then the builder should be liable because those items are 
within the scope of his control and responsibility. 
29
 Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 
(1988) (liability for design defects in military equipment cannot 
be imposed when (1) the United States approved reasonably precise 
specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those 
specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about 
the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the 
supplier but not to the United States). 
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B. Did the Builder Select the Materials or was He Responsible for 
the Construction Technique? 
If the builder selected the materials or was responsible for the 
construction technique, then he owes a duty to subsequent purchasers who 
foreseeably will be injured by the utilization of improper materials or 
improper construction techniques. Just like all other members of 
society, the builder should be responsible for his negligent conduct. 
C. Utilizing a Builder/Vendor Distinction is Not Rational. 
Two different parties can buy a home for exactly the same price, 
the first a custom built according to the owner's specifications and the 
second purchased from a builder/vendor, who selected the design and 
built the house. If both parties sell to a subsequent purchaser who 
discovers latent defects caused by improper construction practices in 
violation of the Uniform Building Code, there is essentially no rational 
distinction to limiting the concept of duty and the implied warranty of 
habitability so the that each are applicable only to the house built by 
the builder/vendor. If the builder is not responsible for the design, 
then the subsequent purchaser should not be able to recover from the 
builder. If the builder, however, is responsible for the selection and 
utilization of improper materials or for improper construction 
techniques, then both the concepts of duty and the implied warranty of 
habitability should extend to the subsequent purchaser. A subsequent 
purchaser who suffers from a defect due to a construction technique by 
a builder -- and the builder in both the custom built home and the track 
home would be responsible for that defect -- the subsequent purchaser 
should be able to recover for the contractor's negligence and should be 
able to recover under the implied warranty of habitability. 
The concepts of "duty" and the "implied warranty of habitability," 
as well as other implied warranties such as the implied warranty of good 
21 
and workmanlike construction, should be limited utilizing the rationale 
of government contractor defense. The Warranty Deed Jarvik gave to the 
Maacks conveyed to them title to their property "together with all the 
appurtenances, rights and privileges thereunto belonging . . . . ff3° 
This language from the statute coveys all "privileges" from Jarvik to 
the Maacks. Consequently, if there is any limitation on either "duty" 
or any implied warranty, that limitation should be imposed based upon a 
critical analysis, not some arbitrary distinction such as 
builder/vendor. 
POINT VI. 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING ON THE MAACKS' MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SEEKING THE DISMISSAL 
OF A PORTION OF HOAGLAND?s AND RESOURCE DESIGN'S 
COUNTERCLAIM IS NEITHER CORRECT NOR MOOT. 
For Hoagland and Resource Design to maintain a cause of action 
based upon implied contract, there must be evidence of a contractual 
relationship between the parties. This matter was placed squarely into 
issue, with the Maacks? argument based upon Hoaglandfs deposition 
testimony that his expectation of payment was not based upon anything 
the Maacks said or did, but was really his own "hope." Given that 
testimony, there is no basis for a finding of a "meeting of the minds," 
which a prerequisite for the finding of a contract between the 
parties.31 
In the event that this Court reverses the District Court's Order 
granting Hoaglandfs and Resource Design's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
then Resource Design and Hoagland undoubtedly will resurrect their 
meritless counterclaim, having previously only dismissed it without 
30
 Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12 (1943). 
31
 B&R Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P. 2d 
1216, 1217 (1972). 
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prejudice. On remand, therefore, the District Court's prior ruling 
would remain the "law of the case."32 Unless Resource Design and 
Hoagland, therefore, are willing to unequivocally state that they have 
no intention and will not resurrect their meritless Counterclaim upon 
remand, then this issue is not moot. 
Further, Hoagland!s Counter-Claim establishes that Hoagland 
contends that there was a contractual relationship between the Maacks, 
on the one hand, and Resource Design and Hoagland, on the other. If 
Hoagland is believed, this contractual relationship required Hoagland to 
do certain repair work. He did not do this work, entitling the Maacks 
to recover all subsequent costs of remedying Hoaglandfs failed attempts 
to cure the defects in the residence. 
POINT VII. 
THE MAACKS PROPERLY PLEAD THEIR STRICT LIABILITY 
CLAIM AGAINST HOAGLAND AND RESOURCE DESIGN. 
The allegations contained in the Second Claim for Relief in the 
First Amended Complaint are that the components of the residence are 
defective, e.g., stucco, adhesive, etc. Hoagland and Resource Design 
properly point out that the District Court dismissed this claim for 
relief for failing to state a claim as a matter of law.33 Based solely 
upon Hoaglandfs and Resource Design's factually unsupported legal 
arguments,34 the District Court concluded that Hoagland and Resource 
32
 E.g., Major v. Benton, 647 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir. 
1981). 
33
 Hoaglandfs and Resource Design's Brief at 32. 
34
 Defendant? s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 1431-543) cites no facts in its Statement or 
Undisputed Facts (R. 1432-35) to support this position that 
Hbagland and Resource Design were not sellers or manufacturers and 
the argument is confined to a claim that the Maacks1 Second Claim 
for Relief fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
(R. 1443-46). 
23 
Design "were not sellers or manufacturers of a product." Even though 
not required to do so, the Maacks, nevertheless, submitted substantial 
evidence demonstrating that Hoagland and Resource Design were the 
sellers of a product. The standard form of agreement between owner and 
contractor36 establishes that Hoagland and Resource Design were the 
sellers of the component parts comprising the home, such as the stucco, 
drains, roof, etc. The Court should not forget that, in this as well as 
all other instances, all inferences in this motion must be drawn in 
favor of the Maacks. Consequently, Hoagland and Resource Design are in 
no different position that Armco Steel occupied in the Ernst W. Hahn, 
Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979). Hoagland and 
Resource Design even concede that Resource Design "is a corporation 
engaged in the general construction contracting business and Mr. 
Hoagland is the President of the corporation."37 
Further, the conclusion can certainly be drawn that it was 
Hoagland who designed and selected various components of the home, such 
as the stucco, membranes, drains, etc.38 
Hoagland's and Resource Design's claim that the home was not 
"unreasonably dangerous" belies the very nature of the defects. The 
entire exterior of this home was dilapidated and crumbling. The only 
inference that can be drawn at this stage of the proceedings is that 
Rule 52 Statement of Grounds and Order Granting Defense's 
Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiffs, If 1 at 5 (R. 2216). 
36
 Exhibit "F" to the Brief of Appellants. 
37
 Hoagland?s and Resource Design's Brief at 34, citing as 
support R. 304, 1493 & 1514. 
38
 Hoagland and Resource Design made no argument and raised 
no facts to support a contrary position. Rememberf the attack was 
leveled against the allegations in the Second Claim for Relief on 
the First Amended Complaint attached as Exhibit "3" to the 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(R. 1476-89). 
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condition is "unreasonably dangerous." It was unreasonably dangerous to 
the same extent as the roof in the Hahn case. 
Resource Design and Hoagland attempt to reintroduce the "economic 
loss" limitation into the area of strict liability. Obviously, the 
cause of action and the damages recoverable are separate issues. The 
W.R.H case puts this issue to rest. Further, although Santor v. A&M 
Karagheuslan, Inc., 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965) did not involve a building, 
it was cited with approval by the Utah Supreme Court39 and clearly 
allowed for the recovery of economic damages utilizing a strict 
liability theory. Given the W.R.Jf case and the fact that the Utah 
Supreme Court in that case cited Santor with approval, a conclusion that 
economic loses are not recoverable under strict products liability would 
be a strained reading of existing, controlling authority from the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
POINT VIII. 
HOAGLAND AND RESOURCE DESIGN NEVER PROPERLY RAISED 
ANY ISSUE RELATING TO MAACKSf "DILIGENCE." 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 1428-30) and 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
1431-1512) do not raise any issue concerning the Maacks' diligence. 
Hoagland and Resource Design do not even raise it belatedly in the Reply 
Memorandum of Defendants' Resource Design and Timothy Hoagland in 
Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 2059-72). Nowhere did 
they cite Klas v. Van Wagoner, 829 P.2d 135 (Utah App. 1992). In 
response to this issue, raised by Hoagland and Resource Design for the 
first time on appeal, the Maacks incorporate by reference Point IV of 
the Appellants' Reply to Jarvik's Brief. 
39
 W.R.H., Inc. v. Economy Builders Supply, 633 P.2d at 45 
n.14. 
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Further, the Court should keep in mind that the Maacks? so-called 
diligence or more properly termed "negligence," when utilized by 
Hoagland and Resource Design as an affirmative defense, is not a total 
or complete defense, as it may be against a recovery based on unilateral 
mistake, the context of the Klas v. Van Wagoner case. Rather, on the 
Maacks? negligence claim against Hoagland and Resource Design, the 
Maacks negligence is only a bar to recovery in the event that it exceeds 
50% of the parties1 total negligence.40 Further, as a defence to 
products liability, misuses is the only defense, and in that situation 
pure comparative principals apply with no fifty percent limitation.41 
CONCLUSION 
By not addressing any particular issue Hoagland or Resource Design 
raised, the Maacks do not intend to waive that issue, but believe that 
the arguments set forth in the Brief of Appellants adequately addresses 
it. For the preceding reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment entered 
in favor of Hoagland and Resource Design and against the Maacks should 
be reversed, with instructions that further proceedings be held 
consistent with this Court's opinion. 
DATED: March 8, 1993. 
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS 
MarJ^  A. Larsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Robert D. Maack and Judith D. Maack 
40 Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1986) 
41
 Mulherln v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1303-04 
(Utah 1981). 
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Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
168 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 56 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
TabB 
CONVEYANCES 57-1-12 
57-1-12. Form of warranty deed — Effect. 
Conveyances of land may be substantially in the following form: 
WARRANTY DEED 
(here insert name), grantor, of (insert place of 
residence), hereby conveys and warrants to (insert name), 
grantee, of (insert place of residence), for the sum of 
dollars, the following described tract of land in 
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the premises). 
Witness the hand of said grantor this day of , 
19 
Such deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a 
conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises 
therein named, together with all the appurtenances, rights and privileges 
thereunto belonging, with covenants from the grantor, his heirs and personal 
representatives, that he is lawfully seised of the premises; that he has good 
right to convey the same; that he guarantees the grantee, his heirs and as-
signs in the quiet possession thereof; that the premises are free from all 
encumbrances; and that the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives 
will forever warrant and defend the title thereof in the grantee, his heirs and 
assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever. Any exceptions to such cove-
nants may be briefly inserted in such deed following the description of the 
land. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1981; 
C.L. 1917, § 4881; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
78-1-11. 
TabC 
GARY B. FERGUSON (A1062) 
KURT M. FRANKENBURG (A5279) 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Third-Party Plaintiffs 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
IN THF THIN TTTnTriAT, DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. MAACK ;rd JUDITH 
MAACK, 
vs. 
RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., a Utah corporation, and 
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an 
individual, Civil No. 900903201CV 
Defendants. 
RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
and TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an 
individual. 
Third-Party I'l.u "i i i I i 
vs. 
ROBERT JARVIK, M.D. 
Third-Party Defendant. 
1 Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Resource 
Design & Constructioi Timothy Hoagland t 
March i1' 1992, came for hearing before the Court, pursuant to 
i . Robert D. Maack was 
FILED DISTRICT COUIT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN17 1992 
1TLAKECOUNJ* 
Mi ^ \ Deputy Clert 
RULE 52 STATEMENT OF GROUNDS 
AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS 
) 
present representing himse I I « in Il ' " " i| » " »•"»" » ' h\ ill i 1, 
Mar* Larser Plaintiff Judith represented by 
'ichael Heyrend and Robert Defendant 
Resource Design & Construction, Inc. ("Resource Design 
Timothy Hoagland were represented by counsel, Kurt M. Frankenburg 
I l1.! i I I i.i,in1 !" Iiiiii! li'""ftfendant J a r v i k a p p e a r e d p r o s e 
participated telephonicall hearings. r 
Defendant Eagar & Company was represented by counsel, Paul D. 
reviewed 
motions, memoranda and supporting materials filed by the parties, 
having considered the arguments presented \t* tearing, and 
g o o d c < i i i! :i e < i j 11 > e i i : • ill i: in ; j lie :i < t s <• J ! s iii I :; ; 
grounds: 
There i s no genuine dispute with respect to the following 
material facts: 
1. Defendant Resource Design & Construction, Inc. 
("Resource Design") has been a Utah corporation in good standing 
since approximately Resource . . . j. 
construction contracting, primari] areas custom 
residential homes and light commercial buildings. 
2. Plaintiff Robert 
practice law in State of utan, and has practiced law the 
Statu | !!III , Ill 11., y e a r s . 
3. In early 1986 E i : Robert Jar\ i k (defendant and 
party defendant) approached Resource Design > request that 
I -, )[ >p 
build p e r s o n c x n s>a±Lm juaive 
City. 
I farvik subsequently contacted a professional house 
designer. Dr. Jarvik presem 
wanted to build to the house designer who then assisted Jarvii 
p 
5 . On o r a b o u t 3 ill ) II
 # . Ill 9 8 6., I il:, = .s ::: 
standard form agreement between owner and contractor with Dr. 
3 mi in I 1 in , I i ill I I in I in n i n e f o r J a r v i k . 
6. Resource Design completed const, 
one year later , Jarvik was very 
sa Resource Design and made final 
payment and acceptance under the construction contract. 
7. Due to a job change, Dr Jarvik moved from Salt Lake 
CJL'J . , , consequently 
listed the completed home for sale. 
8. Dr. Jarvik arranged to have someone live the home 
through
 w :£ n t e r -ented home 
for period of time t;ne summer 
9. On July ?ft, IMIIH plaintiffs Robert and Judith Maack 
contacted the list coking 
at ti house, entered intt Earnest Money Sales Agreement for 
asking pric* -^  Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
specified that plain- m II I mi " s" 
without any warranties < : * condition. 
f ) f , 0 2 3 4 
1 n
 O n , J111 '> .' ' I ' 1 1 1 1 1 i ' 1 ( 1 1 n • i l I - ii r "i' in II i in I mi in i 11 in in I accepted uiie 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement. 
urchasing the home, plaintiffs did not have a 
general contractor, professional inspec i , , ' I «-• e 
inspect the Home on their behalf, 
i fts claim they were informed by Maclyn 
Kesselring of Eagar that there was * 
covering the Home, plaintiffs did for any written 
e v i c l e i i i it 1 I I I! 1 1 I Il i « . . u i r i .•iiiiri * they include any 
reference to a builder's warranty the Earnest Mone^ 
Agreement. 
13. A. _ Money Sales 
Agreement they first learned that the house had been built v 
Resource Design & Construction, Inc. 
1 . I I i nesign 
Hoagland came o: . r about August u-, ,vc6, when Mr. Hoagland sent 
I ] a :! r * * on the stationery oi "'Resource Design & 
Construction, Inc. •• 
15. After closing on the house and moving in, plaintiffs 
ask en I h1*" iiii i Desigi perform certain work home. 
After Resource Design performed subt ' 
home, plaintiffs refused to pay for the work done. 
1 6 . I"!.ii ! in, i ". First Amended Complaint alleges claims for 
negligence, strict liabil- -v rp«; 1 
misrepresentation against defendants Resource Design and 
Hoaglai : , :i 
4 
P l a i n t J i i s t i n in I i I  i i in I lln ill MI I m i l i m I i M I I I m l 
between them and defendants Resource Design or Timothy Hoagland. 
BASED UPON the above undisputed facts, the Court concludes 
as follows: 
Defendants were not sellers or manufacturers of a 
basis for plaintiffs' strict 
liability claim. 
Plaintiffs failed to establish any facts indicating 
il I 1 11 I i I -"representations of fact or 
otherwise Therefore, there i • ITM basis for plaintiffs' 
negligent and/or intentional misrepresentation claim. 
detrimental reliance by them upon alleged representations by 
defendants. Therefore, there is no basis for plaintiffs' 
negligent andy I  JMIIIII HI i Il 
Because there JS no basis for plaintiffs' intentional 
misrepresentation claim, there can be and is no basis 
plaintiffs' punitive damage claim. 
5. Defendants have to plaintiffs which could make 
them oss of use and enjoyment costs of repair or 
replacement u plaintiffs' propert > 
basis plaintiffs' negligence and res ipsa loquitur claims. 
5* Plaintiffs' failure 1 - written 
evidence of a "builder's warranty5 
their offer * purchase the Home on the existence of a "builder's 
VJI.II if I 'j, acceptable inspection report, 
(K". ' : j |h 
especiali 
clearly shows, and a reasonable jury could not find otherwise, 
7fs did not exercise ordinary, reasonable diligence. 
BASED UPON the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the Mot 
for Summary Judgment filed by Resource Desigii & Construction, 
foagland on each and every claim 
asserted against them by plaintiffs. 
DATED this / 7 day <_: l ^ ^ / ^ ^ , 1992. 
< < 
/hy THE cot 
HONORABLE PAT B. BRlAtf 
District Court Judge 
^• ° r#« j \ 
5ATNA.0009U3332 
6 
n r o o i 7 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Mary C. Wardell, being duly sworn,
 says that she is employed 
iii the law offices of Williams & Hunt, attorneys for defendants 
and third-party plaintiffs Resource Design & Construction, Inc. 
and Timothy Hoagland herein; that she served the attached RULE 52 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFFS in Case No. 900903201CV 
before the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, upon the parties listed below by placing a true 
and correct copy thereof In an envelope addressed to: 
Robert K. Jarvik, M.D. (Via First Class Mail) 
124 West 60th Street 
New York, New York 10023 
Robert D. Maack (Via Hand Delivery) 
Mark A. Larsen 
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, 13th Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Paul n Newman, Esq. (via Hand Delivery) 
SNELL & WILMER 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake rit-v. Utah 84111 
Michael R. Heyrend, Esq. (Via Hand Delivery) 
310 E Street 
ake City, Utah 84103 
and causing the same to , mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
or personal?v Kand-delivered, as indicated above, on thp 
day of Mav - "> 
t-lOfdt^ 
M a w n< Wardell 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this JSl day of May, 
1992 
Notary Public ^ • 
SHARON M.ALLHANDS \ 
? - 7 c~.-r ^ - ~ -t Suite 500 I 
' - h 84145, 
Residing in Salt Lak 
County, State of Utah 
I- -J^'i 
